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INTRODUCTION
In the Preface to the 44th Annual Review of Criminal Proce-
dure, Judge Alex Kozinski levels a number of criticisms against
the modern American criminal justice system.1  Central among
those criticisms is his assessment of the fundamental imbal-
ance in criminal trials between the prosecution and the de-
fense: “[W]e like to boast that our criminal justice system is
heavily tilted in favor of criminal defendants because we’d
rather that ten guilty men go free than an innocent man be
convicted.  There is reason to doubt it, because very few crimi-
nal defendants actually go free after trial.”2  Judge Kozinski’s
concern—that the system is rigged to some degree in favor of
† Brigham Young University, B.A. English, 2013; Cornell Law School, J.D.
2017; Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 102.  I am grateful to my wife, Jenessa,
for making any work I do both logistically possible and emotionally fulfilling.  I am
indebted to Professor Valerie Hans for fueling my interest in jury-related criminal
procedures and for guiding my research on the prosecutorial veto.  Finally, I am
grateful for the staff of the Cornell Law Review for the enormous amount of work
they did on my behalf in editing and publishing this work.
1 See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, Preface to 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. iii passim (2015).
2 Id. at iii (footnote omitted).
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the prosecution—is a relatively common one among defense
attorneys and criminal justice reform advocates.3
Less common, however, are the specific measures Judge
Kozinski proposes to ameliorate the criminal justice system’s
flaws.  One of his proposals that would work to rectify this
imbalance centers on the right of the accused to receive a trial
from his peers:
Give criminal defendants the choice of a jury or bench
trial . . .  The prosecution has many institutional advantages,
not the least being that they get to go first and thus have their
theory of the case laid out before the defendant can present
any evidence at all.  I would think it fair to let the defendant
get the choice of judge or jury.4
In many states, when a criminal defendant wants to waive
the right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial, the defendant
must first obtain the consent of the prosecutor.5  Scholars and
practitioners frequently call the refusal of that consent the
“prosecutorial veto,”6 and what Judge Kozinski proposes is its
complete elimination from criminal procedure.7  The primary
goal of this Note is to analyze the merits of that proposal.  The
Note will provide the relevant legal background to the issue,
including the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the
prosecutorial veto in Part I, and the various federal and state
statutory approaches to the issue in Part II.  Then, in Part III,
the Note will consider the merits of Judge Kozinski’s proposal
to eliminate the prosecutorial veto by exploring the policy argu-
ments for it.  Finally, in Part IV, the Note will make the case
against the prosecutorial veto.  The Note will conclude by
3 See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-
people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/S6KS-GGKB].
4 Kozinski, supra note 1, at xlii–xliii (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). R
5 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 1.13(a) (West 2016) (“The defendant in
a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony case in which
the state notifies the court and the defendant that it will seek the death penalty
shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury,
conditioned, however, that, except as provided by Article 27.19, the waiver must
be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and
approval of the court, and the attorney representing the state.  The consent and
approval by the court shall be entered of record on the minutes of the court, and
the consent and approval of the attorney representing the state shall be in writing,
signed by that attorney, and filed in the papers of the cause before the defendant
enters the defendant’s plea.”).
6 Fred Anthony DeCicco, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A
Reassessment of the “Prosecutorial Veto,” 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1983).
7 See Kozinski, supra note 1, at xlii. R
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agreeing with Judge Kozinski’s proposal and arguing for its
adoption.
I
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
PROSECUTORIAL VETO
The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub-
lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.”8  The Supreme Court
has outlined the contours of the right to a jury trial through a
series of cases that centers on which kind of crimes trigger the
right.  In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court held that a misde-
meanor case triggers the right to a jury trial where it carries a
maximum sentence of two years.9  In that case, the Court iden-
tified the constitutional purpose of the jury trial guarantee in
criminal trials—a purpose that is particularly relevant in a dis-
cussion of the accused’s ability to waive that right: “[p]roviding
an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.”10
Two years later, the Supreme Court clarified its standard
for when a criminal trial triggers the constitutional right to a
jury trial.11  In Baldwin v. New York, the Court held that any
crime that is punishable with six or more months of imprison-
ment is a serious crime and triggers the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial.12
The issue of the prosecutorial veto arises only in cases
where the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant a right
to jury trial.13  Thus, in cases not within the Baldwin definition
for a crime punishable with six or more months of imprison-
ment, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is not triggered,
and the defendant has no jury trial right to waive.
The question of whether the defendant in a federal trial
could waive the jury right guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9 391 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
10 Id. at 156.
11 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–74 (1970).
12 See id. (“We cannot, however, conclude that . . . administrative conve-
niences . . . can similarly justify denying an accused the important right to trial by
jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months’ imprisonment.”).
13 See DeCicco, supra note 6, at 1094. R
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first came before the Court in Patton v. United States.14  There,
the defendants had not proactively attempted to waive their
right to a jury in order to secure a more favorable outcome;
rather, one juror had withdrawn from the jury for illness, and
the trial court judge had continued the trial with the consent of
the defendant and the prosecutor with only eleven jurors rather
than the traditionally required15 twelve jurors.16  The Supreme
Court in Patton held that this action was a waiver of the jury
right by the defendant and that it was constitutional.17  The
Court then held that “before any waiver can become effective,
the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the
court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent
consent of the defendant.”18
The issue again came before the Supreme Court in Singer
v. United States, where a defendant, again in a federal district
court trial, had attempted to waive his right to a jury without
the consent of the prosecutor.19  In Singer, unlike in Patton, the
defendant wanted to waive his right to a jury trial in order to
receive a bench trial and so requested on the first day of trial.
The government refused to consent, and the jury convicted the
defendant.  On appeal, he argued that Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the prosecutor to
give consent in order to grant a defendant a waiver of the jury
trial, was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.20  As
the Notes of the Advisory Committee for Rule 23 say, federal
courts generally required the defendant to obtain the consent
of the prosecution even before the ruling of Singer or the pro-
mulgation of Rule 23(a).21
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that “the
Constitution neither confers nor recognizes a right of criminal
defendants to have their cases tried before a judge alone” and
declined to find Rule 23(a) unconstitutional.22  Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated as the opinion’s central
rationale that “[t]he Constitution recognizes an adversary sys-
tem as the proper method of determining guilt, and the Govern-
14 281 U.S. 276, 287 (1930).
15 The Supreme Court later held that a jury does not need twelve members in
order to meet the demands of the Sixth Amendment. See Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 102–03 (1970).
16 See Patton, 281 U.S. at 286.
17 See id. at 312–13.
18 Id.
19 380 U.S. 24, 25 (1965).
20 See id. at 26.
21 Advisory Committee’s Note to Subdivision (a) to FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
22 Singer, 380 U.S. at 26.
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ment, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases
in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before
the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to
produce a fair result.”23 Singer was the last Supreme Court
decision on the prosecutorial veto, and the rationale the Singer
Court employed to validate the prosecutorial veto would be-
come the conduit through which the prosecutorial veto estab-
lished its place in modern American criminal law.
II
FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTORY APPROACHES TO THE
PROSECUTORIAL VETO
Federal courts unilaterally require the government to pro-
vide its consent before a defendant can waive the right to a jury
trial.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) says that “[i]f
the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury
unless: (1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing; (2) the
government consents; and (3) the court approves.”24
State courts differ widely on which parties need to provide
consent in order for the defendant to waive, but they generally
divide into three groups.  The first group tracks the federal law
and requires consent from both the government and the court.
California, a member of this first group, includes the following
provision in its Constitution: “A jury may be waived in a crimi-
nal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open
court by the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.”25  States
with similar statutes include Indiana26 and West Virginia.27
The second group of states require only that the defendant
obtain the court’s approval; that is, each of these states has
abolished the prosecutorial veto but still require judicial ap-
proval.  States in this second group include Massachusetts28
and Washington.29  The third and final group of states have no
23 Id. at 36.
24 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
25 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
26 See IND. CODE § 35-37-1-2 (2016) (“The defendant and prosecuting attor-
ney, with the assent of the court, may submit the trial to the court.”).
27 See W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (“Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so
tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the
court and the consent of the state.”).
28 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 19(a) (“A case in which the defendant has the right to
be tried by a jury shall so be tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in
writing with the approval of the court and files the waiver with the clerk, in which
instance he shall be tried by the court instead of by a jury.”).
29 See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.060 (2016) (“No person informed against or
indicted for a crime shall be convicted thereof, unless by . . . the verdict of a jury,
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requirement that the defendant obtain consent of any party,
and have, in effect, given the defendant an absolute right to
waive the right to a jury trial.  In this group are Connecticut30
and Illinois.31  This final group of states have enacted by stat-
ute a total elimination of the prosecutorial veto in criminal
trials as Judge Kozinski proposed.32
The map below illustrates the disparity in approaches
among states toward the right to jury trial waiver.33  The most
darkly shaded states are those states in the first group that
require both the consent of the court and the consent of the
government.  The gray states are those states in the second
group that require only consent of the court.  The most lightly
shaded colored states constitute the third group of states that
have given the defendant an absolute right to waive the jury
trial.
FIGURE 1
Court & Gov’t Consent Court Consent Only Absolute Right
accepted and recorded by the court: PROVIDED HOWEVER . . . where the person
informed against or indicted for a crime is represented by counsel, such person
may, with the assent of the court, waive trial by jury and submit to trial by the
court.”).
30 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-82(a) (2015) (“In any criminal case, prosecution
or proceeding, the accused may, if the accused so elects when called upon to
plead, be tried by the court instead of by the jury . . . .”).
31 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-6 (2016) (“Every person accused of an
offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless . . . understandingly waived by
defendant in open court . . . .”).
32 See supra text accompanying notes 1–6. R
33 For a complete list of citations of the state statutes and rules of criminal
procedure from which this map was made, see APPENDIX of this Note.
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As the map shows, a majority of the states (the most darkly
shaded states) require both prosecutorial consent and court
consent before a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial.
There are thirty total states in this group.  Sixteen states (the
gray states) require only consent of the court, and only four
states (the most lightly shaded states), a considerable minority,
have given the defendant an absolute right to jury trial waiver.
It should be noted that there is some gray area between these
categorical distinctions.  Some states, like Louisiana, only re-
quire consent of the court unless the defendant wishes to waive
the right to a jury trial after a certain number of days before the
commencement of the trial, at which point the defendant needs
to obtain the consent of the prosecutor as well as the court.34
Also, although Ohio grants the defendant an absolute right to
waive the jury trial, that right expires at the commencement of
the trial, at which point the defendant must obtain the prose-
cutor’s and the court’s consent in order to waive the jury trial
right and proceed to a bench trial.35  Ohio is also one of a
number of states that separates “serious” offenses from “petty”
offenses in determining the applicability of the jury trial right.36
For trials of “petty offenses” where the defendant has a right to
a jury trial, the defendant will receive a bench trial unless the
defendant demands a jury trial.37  In Ohio, a defendant’s fail-
ure to do so constitutes a waiver of the jury trial right.  Al-
though all fifty states now have a governing legal rule allowing
for some waiver of the jury right, North Carolina was the most
recent to adopt one.  Up until 2014, North Carolina did not
allow, even with the consent of the prosecutor and the court,
any waiver of the right to a jury trial.38
34 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 780(B)–(C) (2016) (“The waiver shall be
by written motion filed in the district court not later than forty-five days prior to
the date the case is set for trial.  The motion shall be signed by the defendant and
shall also be signed by defendant’s counsel unless the defendant has waived his
right to counsel. . . .  With the consent of the district attorney the defendant may
waive trial by jury within forty-five days prior to the commencement of trial.”).
35 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 23(A) (“In serious offense cases the defendant before com-
mencement of the trial may knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive in writ-
ing his right to trial by jury.  Such waiver may also be made during trial with the
approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney.”).
36 Id.
37 See id. (“In petty offense cases, where there is a right of jury trial, the
defendant shall be tried by the court unless he demands a jury trial.  Such
demand must be in writing and filed with the clerk of court not less than ten days
prior to the date set for trial, or on or before the third day following receipt of
notice of the date set for trial, whichever is later.  Failure to demand a jury trial as
provided in this subdivision is a complete waiver of the right thereto.”).
38 See Editor’s Note to N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24, as reprinted in N.C. RET. SYS. L.
(2016), https://www.nctreasurer.com/2016Lawbook/nccarti/nccarti-24.htm
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III
THE POLICY ARGUMENTS BEHIND THE
PROSECUTORIAL VETO
The relative differences in the states’ procedural ap-
proaches to the prosecutorial veto reveal the varied purposes
served by the prosecutorial veto or by its absence.  A jurisdic-
tion, for instance, may require judicial consent before defen-
dant may waive their right to a jury trial because the
lawmakers believe the jury is the fact-finder most likely to
achieve a fair and accurate outcome to any given trial.39  The
judge in that case acts as a representative of that interest and
may decide whether a particular case would be more fairly
treated in a bench trial.
Assuming the Duncan rationale for the jury right remains
its central basis—that the right to a jury trial exists primarily to
protect the defendant, and not to serve any other governmental
or communal interests—there are significant dangers of grant-
ing a defendant an absolute right to a jury trial waiver.40  One
major criticism of a defendant’s right to waive a jury trial is that
a zealous prosecutor may actually benefit from a defendant’s
ability to waive the jury trial.41  The prosecution may believe it
is at a disadvantage in a jury trial or may otherwise be uncom-
fortable with the unpredictability of a jury and offer a defen-
dant more amenable charges in exchange for the defendant
waiving the jury trial.  Critics of an absolute right to a jury trial
waiver also worry that a defendant may waive when it is not
actually in the defendant’s best interest.  By denying the defen-
dant this choice, the Court ensures the defendant all of the
constitutional protections that may benefit her.
[https://perma.cc/F7VA-2DCQ] (“Session Laws 2013-300, s. 3, provides: ‘If a
majority of the votes cast on the question are in favor of the amendment set out in
Section 1 of this act, the State Board of Elections shall certify the amendment to
the Secretary of State, who shall enroll the amendment so certified among the
permanent records of that office.  The amendment becomes effective December 1,
2014, and applies to criminal offenses arraigned in superior court on or after that
date.’”).
39 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.060 (2016) (“[W]here the person in-
formed against or indicted for a crime is represented by counsel, such person
may, with the assent of the court, waive trial by jury and submit to trial by the
court.”).
40 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
41 For an op-ed written by a defense attorney espousing just this position, see
James Payne, Vote ‘No’ to Amendment to Waive Jury Trial, STARNEWS ONLINE (Sept.
12, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.starnewsonline.com/opinion/20140912/james-
payne—-vote-no-to-amendment-to-waive-jury-trial [https://perma.cc/8AU3-
FLD2] (“[P]rosecutors may use the leverage of their charging authority to unduly
influence a defendant to waive their right to a jury trial.”).
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While the Court has, as noted above, explicitly stated that
the purpose of the Sixth Amendment and the right to the jury
trial is to protect the accused from the “overzealous prosecutor”
and the “eccentric judge,”42 the prosecutorial veto serves an-
other interest not expressly outlined in the Sixth Amendment.
In an adversary system, both parties need to work from equal
ground, and as the Court in Singer noted, the prosecutorial
veto acts as a balance to the defendant’s ability to waive the
jury right.43  Jurisdictions where the defendant must acquire
the prosecution’s consent to waive the right to jury trial afford
to the prosecution the same right as the defendant to avoid the
“eccentric judge.”44  Just as a defendant may wish to avoid the
jury trial in particular cases, so might a prosecutor want to
avoid trying her case before a particular judge.  The
prosecutorial veto to the defendant’s waiver ensures that the
prosecution has at its disposal the same tools as the defense.
The prosecutorial veto, then, acts as an additional mecha-
nism through which the adversarial system balances the rights
of each party.  The Court in Singer reasons on the assumption
that to satisfy the interests of the adversary system is to di-
rectly satisfy the interests of justice.45  Rather than entrust the
assessment of fairness to a judge, who acts as the mediator
between the two parties, and who would ideally, in the case of a
jury trial waiver, determine whether a fair adjudication would
occur more likely with a bench trial or with a jury, the Court in
Singer believes adversarial parties working on equal ground are
more likely than any given judge to achieve the fairest outcome.
Beyond the interest in the adversarial system, though, the
prosecutorial veto may serve the interest of a third party not
directly involved in any criminal trial: the community.  A grow-
ing body of research suggests that there are societal benefits
that criminal jury trials provide—benefits that affect both the
people who serve on the jury as well as the community in which
they serve.  In his book on the subject, John Gastil and his
colleagues found, after interviewing thousands of jurors about
their experiences, that “[p]articipating in the jury process can
be an invigorating process for jurors that changes their under-
standing of themselves and their sense of political power and
broader civic responsibilities.”46  Gastil and his colleagues ar-
42 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
43 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
44 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
45 See Singer, 380 U.S. at 36.
46 JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PRO-
MOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 4 (2010).
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gue that jury trials perform a more expansive function than
achieving a fair outcome or protecting criminal defendants
against corrupt prosecutors and “eccentric judge[s].”47  Gastil,
with the help of data,48 argues that juries play a crucial, even
necessary role in a democracy:
[M]embers of a democratic society need to connect not just
with each other but also with the state in ways that are
inspiring, empowering, educational, and habit form-
ing. . . .  This perspective provides a new appreciation of the
unique position of the jury, through which a state institution
brings private citizens together to deliberate on a public
problem.49
This understanding of the role of the jury in American de-
mocracy offers another possible policy justification for the
prosecutorial veto.  If jury service is, by itself and regardless of
its effect on any given criminal trial, an inherent positive for
communities, then the prosecutorial veto serves the commu-
nity’s interest by rejecting any attempts to bypass the jury trial.
When jury service increases a citizen’s desire to participate in
the political process by voting, for instance,50 then the govern-
ment has an interest in offering as many opportunities for a
juror to serve as possible.  The government, acting not only in
its role as a party to the criminal trial but as a representative of
the interests of the community, may use the prosecutorial veto
to ensure that juries try cases as frequently as possible.  In a
jurisdiction that values highly the societal benefits derived
from jury trials, lawmakers have an incentive to guard against
any unnecessary bench trials.51
47 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; see GASTIL, supra note 46, at 4. R
48 Gastil on his methodology:
We analyzed official county records of jury service (and voting his-
tory) from over ten thousand empanelled jurors from eight counties
across the United States.  With funding from the National Science
Foundation, we then surveyed thousands of people called for jury
service in King County, Washington.  They filled out question-
naires . . . .  Finally, we conducted in-depth interviews—face-to-face
and by phone—with a smaller number of jurors.
GASTIL, supra note 46, at 4–5. R
49 Id. at 9.
50 Gastil and his colleagues found that jurors who deliberated in criminal
trials (but not civil trials) were more likely to have voted in subsequent years. See
id. at 9–10.
51 In United States v. Lewis, one of the few federal court cases that upheld a
court’s decision to overrule the prosecutorial veto, Chief Judge Douglas Hillman
offered yet another benefit that jury trials confer on society at large: “As the lid of a
tea kettle releases steam, jury trials in criminal cases allow peaceful expression of
community outrage at arbitrary government or vicious criminal acts.” 638 F.
Supp. 573, 580 (W.D. Mich. 1986).  In other words, Chief Judge Hillman views the
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Finally, as Justice Antonin Scalia writes in Blakely v.
Washington, “[j]ust as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate
control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”52  The
prosecutorial veto serves this interest by increasing, however
slightly, the number of trials in which the jury and by extension
the community may have a voice.
IV
THE CASE AGAINST THE PROSECUTORIAL VETO
If, however, the criminal justice system has, either in cer-
tain kinds of cases or with certain kinds of defendants, slanted
jury trials in favor of the prosecution, then the community
benefits of a jury trial are of small comfort to the defendant
seeking protection from an unfair system.  The question then
would become not whether there are adequate policy justifica-
tions for the prosecutorial veto but whether those justifications
would outweigh the interest in just process and fair trials.
According to the Court’s explanations in both Duncan and
Singer, the primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment trial right
is to achieve the most just outcome, and not serve alternative
purposes like catalyzing increased civic participation.53  As the
Court stated in Duncan, the framers designed the Sixth
Amendment, like they did all of the Amendments in the Bill of
Rights, with the purpose of protecting individuals against un-
due encroachments from the government.54  Assuming that
stated purpose is indeed the goal of the Sixth Amendment jury
trial right, the interest in protecting the defendant from an
unjust outcome would appear to supersede any interest in in-
creased civic participation or in evening the playing field for the
prosecutor.
So does a prosecutor require the prosecutorial veto in order
to balance the adversarial system or is the system already tilted
one way?  Do defendants begin their trials at an inherent disad-
vantage simply by virtue of being defendants?
jury trial as a conduit for community speech both for and against the government.
The rest of this Note will consider this benefit a subset of the more general benefit
of greater civic engagement.
52 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
53 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 145, 157–58 (1968); Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
54 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151.
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A number of scholars, practicing attorneys, and judges be-
lieve that they do.55  There are several institutional disadvan-
tages that lead one to question whether the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard leaves the defendant with a clear
net benefit.56  One of those institutional disadvantages is that
the prosecution presents its case first, which, according to
some research, makes the jury more likely to believe the
prosecution.57
In light of these institutional disadvantages, the Supreme
Court’s justification for the Singer rule appears inadequate at
best and starkly unjust at worst.  By framing the prosecutorial
veto as a necessary counterweight to the defendant’s ability to
waive the jury trial, the Court assumes that the two parties
have begun the trial on level footing.  If the opposite is true,
that is, if the defense begins at a distinct disadvantage, then
the prosecutorial veto only adds another mechanism by which
courts reinforce that disadvantage.  Given this understanding,
courts should abandon the prosecutorial veto if for no other
reason than to establish the defendant’s absolute right to
choose between bench and jury as a counterbalance to the
prosecution’s inherent advantages.
More than just reinforcing it, though, the prosecutorial
veto worsens the imbalance against defendants.  As Nancy
King and Rosevelt Noble point out in their article on the sub-
ject, the prosecutorial veto frequently acts as another factor
contributing to the uneven bargaining power during plea nego-
tiations.58  They note that prosecutors who have the veto and
can ensure that their case will be tried and sentenced by a jury
use those facts to their advantage in plea bargaining: “Defense
attorneys and judges reported that prosecutors used the threat
of a jury’s sentence to obtain pleas in some cases, particularly
drug and sex offense cases.”59
Jury sentencing, as King and Noble point out, adds an-
other dimension to the threat of the prosecutorial veto.  In
some states, if a jury tries a case, then a jury also sentences in
55 See generally Kozinski, supra note 1, at iii–xiii (listing “some of the reasons
to doubt that our criminal justice system is fundamentally just”).
56 See id. at ix.
57 See id. (“[J]urors start forming a mental picture of the events in question as
soon as they first hear about them from the prosecution witnesses.  Later-intro-
duced evidence, even if pointing in the opposite direction, may not be capable of
fundamentally altering that picture . . . .”).
58 See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice:
A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 926 (2004).
59 Id.
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that case,60 and in those states with jury sentencing and the
prosecutorial veto, prosecutors have a powerful weapon with
which to threaten defendants.  Of Arkansas prosecutors, King
and Noble note that “many . . . seem to believe jury sentencing
is a hammer useful for obtaining guilty pleas.”61  King and
Noble note that prosecutors frequently assess how a case will
play in front of a jury, and in those cases where a jury is more
likely to favor the prosecution—precisely the cases where a
defendant seeking a fairer trial would waive the right to a jury
trial—the prosecution leverages the possible use of the jury
trial in plea agreements.62  When researchers asked a judge
about the practice, he explained how it worked in his county:
A: As a matter of strategy, then, in some counties, including
mine, in serious cases the prosecutor will not agree to waive a
jury.
Q: So the prosecutor uses jury sentencing as leverage to get
the plea?
A: Exactly.  In some less serious cases, say larceny or prop-
erty offenses, the prosecutor is not as likely to insist on the
jury. . . . But in cases that are likely to outrage a jury, they’re
going to ask for a jury.63
As the judge points out, the prosecutorial veto handicaps de-
fendants most in need of a bench trial.  Where the facts of a
case will bias a jury against a defendant, and one need not look
far for an example of that kind of case,64 and the defendant
would benefit from the relative impartiality of a bench trial, the
prosecutor with a veto in hand can use the defendant’s fear of
the jury to extract a harsher plea deal than the defendant oth-
erwise might agree to.
60 Ironically, that more jurisdictions should institute the practice of jury sen-
tencing is another of Judge Kozinski’s proposals for reforming the criminal justice
system. See Kozinski, supra note 1, at xxi (“[W]e studiously ignore the views of the R
very people who heard the evidence and are given the responsibility to determine
guilt or innocence while reflecting the values of the community in which the
offense occurred. . . .  Jurors should be instructed on the range of punishments
authorized by law and, if they find the defendant guilty, entrusted to weigh in on
the appropriate sentence within that range.”).
61 King & Noble, supra note 58, at 940 (emphasis omitted). R
62 See id. at 922.
63 Id.
64 See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Examine Racial Divide in Jury Selec-
tion, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/supreme-court-to-examine-racial-divide-in-jury-selection/2015/10/
25/005ecc56-774d-11e5-a958-d889faf561dc_story.html [https://perma.cc/
74VD-4AK6] (describing the facts of Foster v. Chatman, a case in which the defen-
dant alleges prosecutors struck black jurors because they were black).
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For example, in an especially high-profile case like the
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev case—in which it was virtually impossible
for Tsarnaev to find a jury with no outside knowledge of the
Boston Marathon bombings65—a defendant’s only possible av-
enue to a comparatively fair trial might be through a bench
trial.66  Of course, the prosecutorial veto would limit, if not
eliminate, a defendant like Tsarnaev’s ability to get that bench
trial.
More than anything else, this practice appears to directly
contradict the Supreme Court’s stated purpose for the Sixth
Amendment.  If the Sixth Amendment protects or attempts to
protect defendants from the “overzealous prosecutor,”67 then
the prosecutor’s capacity to veto a jury trial right waiver serves
the opposite purpose.  The prosecutorial veto enables the “over-
zealous prosecutor” to achieve a more favorable outcome than
he or she otherwise could.  In other words, the prosecutorial
veto, considered by the Court as another additional cog in the
machine of the adversarial system,68 becomes another mecha-
nism by which the prosecutor asserts institutionalized advan-
tage.  While this is especially true where the jury has the power
to sentence in addition to convict the defendant, it is no less
applicable to those jurisdictions where the defendant has an
interest in trying his or her case before a judge but cannot
obtain consent from the prosecutor.
The problems with plea bargaining are well-documented.
As Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss lament in an article on
the gradual deterioration of the American criminal jury, uneven
power in plea bargaining often leads to innocent defendants
pleading guilty to crimes they did not commit in order to receive
the guarantee of a lesser sentence.69  Crowded dockets and
overworked public defenders lead to plea deals even for triable
cases.  In the case of one defendant, the first day he met and
65 See Ann O’Neill, The 13th Juror: When Picking a Jury Turns into a Mara-
thon, CNN (Feb. 6, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/29/us/
dzhokhar-tsarnaev-trial-13th-juror/ [https://perma.cc/67FS-UB2H].  Although
the court did eventually select the jury, Tsarnaev’s lawyers maintained that the
jury was biased.  Trisha Thadani, List of Jurors in Boston Marathon Bombing Trial
Released, USA Today (Feb. 13, 2016, 2:54 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2016/02/13/list-jurors-tsarnaev-trial-released/80339644/
[https://perma.cc/4K3B-5ESL].
66 Tsarnaev’s case was in a federal court and thus subject to FED. R. CRIM. P.
23(a).
67 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
68 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965).
69 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 926 (1994).
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spoke with his lawyer, she advised that he take the plea agree-
ment for no jail time that the prosecutors offered him.  That
same day, she had made an appearance in court for thirty
other felony cases.  However, authorities later learned that “[he]
was not guilty of the charge to which he had pleaded guilty;
through a bureaucratic error, they had confused him with
someone else.”70  Now, with many states adopting three strikes
statutes in which three felony convictions can lead to jail time
up to life without parole, even plea deals for no jail time can be
extremely costly to a defendant.
Not only do most plea negotiations begin with uneven bar-
gaining power in favor of the prosecutor, but plea negotiations,
like many mechanisms within the criminal justice system,
treat similar defendants differently based on their race.  In a
study done by the Vera Institute of Justice and funded by the
Department of Justice, researchers found that black and His-
panic defendants were more likely to receive plea deals that
included prison sentences than were white defendants who
had committed the same crimes.71  This study in concert with
many others raises worrisome questions about the role of race
and ethnicity in plea negotiations.  Just as with studies on
sentencing in death penalty cases,72 data like these illustrate
that the procedures already in place to protect defendants from
unjust outcomes because of their race are not sufficient.
The stakes in criminal cases are the highest the judicial
system faces, and the potential for harm to a defendant is
70 Id.
71 See James McKinley, Jr., Study Finds Racial Disparity in Criminal Prosecu-
tions, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion
/09race.html [https://perma.cc/UN7G-2W32] (“The study found blacks were 27
percent more likely than whites to receive jail or prison time for misdemeanor
drug offenses, while Hispanic defendants were 18 percent more likely to be incar-
cerated for those crimes.”).
72 E.g., David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 661
(1983).  In addition to the famous Baldus study, see, for example, Ed Pilkington,
Research Exposes Racial Discrimination in America’s Death Penalty Capital,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
mar/13/houston-texas-death-row-black-inmates [https://perma.cc/EB7H-
PVFY] (discussing the research of a University of Maryland criminologist Ray
Paternoster who found that “[t]he probability that the district attorney will ad-
vance a case to a [death] penalty trial is more than three times as high when the
defendant is African American than for white defendants[.]”) (second alteration
added).  The NAACP’s Legal Defense and Educational Fund has published Pater-
noster’s research in its entirety. See RAY PATERNOSTER, RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CASE
OF DUANE EDWARD BUCK (2012), NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, http://www.naa
cpldf.org/files/case_issue/Duane%20Buck-FINAL%20Signed%20Paternoster
%20Report%20(00032221).pdf [https://perma.cc/H4BS-7QZG].
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great.  Given that plea bargaining is the most common resolu-
tion to criminal trials73 and that it frequently leads to unjust
outcomes for defendants,74 the most readily apparent solution
is to establish counterbalances to the prosecution’s inherent
advantages.  One of those counterbalances could be a defen-
dant’s absolute right to a jury trial waiver.  In all plea negotia-
tions, and especially in jurisdictions that allow for jury
sentencing, prosecutors possess disproportionate power such
that the Singer Court’s lauded adversarial system no longer
pulls equally from both sides.75  As the criminal justice system
currently stands, the prosecutorial veto only makes the rich
richer.  Prosecutors can deny consent in all of the cases where
a defendant would need it most, rendering the waiver of the
jury trial right less a tool for the defendant to choose the most
just venue and more a tool for the court to enjoy a more stream-
lined adjudication.76
In this context, sacrificing a fairer process is too high a
price even to gain the benefits of more jury trials that the
prosecutorial veto may enable.  Civic engagement and political
participation are indeed large profits from a robust jury institu-
tion, but frequently, the government does not use its veto in
order to insist on a jury trial.  Instead, prosecutors withhold
consent as leverage for a more favorable plea agreement.77  As
Professor George Fisher has noted in his book, the gradual
adoption of the plea agreement as the preferred method for
resolution has caused an increase in procedures that en-
courage that end: participants in the legal process like lawyers
and judges “raise up those procedural institutions that help
plea bargaining and beat down those that threaten it.”78
As the plea bargaining process has grown in its popularity,
the jury, a once proud staple of the American criminal justice
system, has faded into relative insignificance.  Alschuler and
Deiss see the advent of the plea bargain as the culprit:
73 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 69, at 924 (“Nevertheless, plea bargaining R
apparently became the dominant method of resolving even serious cases in urban
America . . . .”).
74 Id. at 926.
75 See discussion infra note 80. R
76 See King & Noble, supra note 58, at 889. R
77 See id. at 940 (“[M]any Arkansas prosecutors seem to believe jury sentenc-
ing is a hammer useful for obtaining guilty pleas . . . .”).
78 GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 180 (2003).
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The American right to jury trial now resembles the hippopot-
amus in New York City. . . .  The protagonists on both sides of
the nineteenth-century battle over the authority of judge and
jury to resolve questions of law have suffered resounding
defeat.  Today prosecutors are the judges of law and fact.79
Surely any attempt at restoring the jury to its former stature in
order to reap the benefits of a more civically and politically
engaged populace should begin at a reform of the plea bargain-
ing process rather than with the jury trial waiver.  It is there
that the battle was lost, and there it should resume.
Finally, the Singer Court’s rationale that the prosecutorial
veto is an implement of the equal adversarial role of the prose-
cutor seems to deny the ugly reality that the modern criminal
justice system is no longer balanced in favor of the defendant.80
The Singer Court recognizes that the original purpose of the
Sixth Amendment, and indeed the Bill of Rights as a whole,
was to “protect the accused from oppression by the Govern-
ment.”81  However, the underlying assumption of the Singer
Court is that the Sixth Amendment in combination with the
rest of criminal procedure is performing its function in protect-
ing the accused from Government oppression.  If that were the
case, the Court’s decision to empower prosecutors to veto jury
trial waivers would serve the balancing interests that it pur-
ports to.82  Unfortunately, in a system rigged against the defen-
dant from the outset, the prosecutorial veto only worsens the
imbalance.
Assuming then that the purpose of the jury trial waiver
right is the Duncan rationale,83 one major criticism remains of
granting the defendant an absolute right to waive the trial:
79 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 69, at 927. R
80 For an argument that the Singer Court’s rationale was internally contradic-
tory because it “creates an unbearable tension between two prosecutorial roles:
that of litigant in an adversary system and that of neutral agent of justice[,]” see
George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the
Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REV. 804, 816 (1995) (“While the prosecutor may
fulfill both roles at various times in the course of a prosecution, she cannot
realistically remain a neutral agent of justice above the adversary fray at the time
that she is asked to consent to jury waiver.”).
81 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965).
82 For a pragmatic, efficiency-based argument against the prosecutorial veto,
see DeCicco, supra note 6, at 1111 (“The expense and delay imposed on the R
defendant in [complex] cases may outweigh the general public interest in having
the issues resolved by a jury.”).
83 “Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave
him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 156 (1968).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN605.txt unknown Seq: 18 29-SEP-17 13:02
1734 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1717
doing so may actually expose the defendant to yet another
prosecutorial advantage.  If the prosecutor can manipulate the
defendant into waiving the jury trial when the jury trial would
be to his or her advantage, then granting the defendant that
right would do nothing to balance out the inherent inequities in
the criminal justice system.  Prosecutors could also threaten to
raise the charges or add additional charges if the defendant
refused to waive the jury trial.  Though there is ample research
that the prosecutorial veto has an effect on the power dynamics
in plea bargaining,84 there is virtually none on the opposite
proposition.85
There are some cited instances in particular cases of prose-
cutors using the threat of charges to induce the defendant into
waiving his right to a jury right trial.  In Smith v. State, a Mary-
land case from 2003, the defendant, who faced several drug
charges and as a repeat drug offender was vulnerable to steep
sentences should he be convicted, refused to plead guilty.86
However, after the prosecutors changed the terms of the deal to
lower the charges in exchange for the defendant’s waiver of his
jury trial right, the defendant agreed and was later convicted in
a bench trial.87
Even further, there is a paternalism at the core of the criti-
cism that assumes that defense attorneys and defendants will
be unable to weigh the relative costs and risks of accepting a
plea bargain in exchange for waiving the jury trial, a practice
defense attorneys already employ when the defendants must
decide whether to plead guilty and waive their right to any trial
at all.88  While the power dynamics in a given plea bargaining
situation favor the prosecution, the defendant and the defense
attorney who are planning on going to trial have a bargaining
power that the defendant who is open to pleading guilty does
not.  The latter defendant is frequently accompanied by an
84 See supra notes 58–63, 71–79 and accompanying text. R
85 See Harris, supra note 80, at 816 (“A bench trial over the prosecutor’s R
objection under the Singer exception is, in any case, a logical impossibility.”).
86 375 Md. 365, 369 (2003).
87 See id. at 368.  On appeal, the defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury was violated because he had been coerced into waiving his
right to a jury trial and that there was an expectation of a more lenient sentence
because of his waiver. See id.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the
defendant’s conviction on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to
show that either the trial judge had suggested leniency to induce the defendant to
waive or that the trial judge’s sentencing decision was based on a waiver of the
right to jury trial. See id. at 403.
88 See Harris, supra note 80, at 817 (“[J]ust as the conscientious defense R
attorney will advise her client to waive only if she believes the court is at least as
likely to acquit.”).
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overburdened defense attorney who is looking to bargain a way
out of going to trial in order to cope with a demanding case
load, which is one of the key conditions that exposes the defen-
dant to an unfair plea bargaining process.  A defense attorney
who is already prepared to go to trial has an additional leverage
to safeguard against an unfair plea deal.
Finally and most critically, many states (the gray group on
the map89) have bypassed this difficulty at least in part by
granting the Court the power to deny or grant a defendant’s
waiver of jury trial.90  That way, as an impartial third party, the
judge may weigh the interests of the defendant in determining
whether to accept the jury trial waiver.  Certainly it would be no
solution to this problem to grant the prosecution the ability to
veto the defendant’s attempt to waive the jury trial.  The prose-
cution, as an adversarial party, would have the incentive to use
that veto to its advantage rather than as a mechanism for as-
suring that the defendant has not forsaken his or her rights
unwisely.  Also, significantly, many states expressly prohibit
judges from engaging in the practice of influencing the plea
bargain, which allows judges to sit as detached arbiters of the
fairness of the defendant waiving his or her right to a jury
trial.91
Granting the courts the power to deny or allow jury trial
waivers would be much more likely to resolve any potential
unfairness to the defendant.  Further, courts already make de-
terminations as to the validity of a defendant’s waiver of consti-
tutional rights, and to do so here would add no additional
procedural requirement than those already in place for other
constitutional rights.92  Before North Carolina’s legislature
voted on whether to amend their state constitution to include a
provision for jury trial right waiver, a group of researchers at
University of North Carolina expressed concerns that judges,
like prosecutors, had incentives to pressure defendants into
89 See supra p. fig.1.
90 See, e.g., ME. R.U. CRIM. P. 23(a) (“All cases in the Unified Criminal Docket
shall proceed to jury trial unless the defendant, with the approval of the court,
waives a jury trial in writing signed by the defendant in open court . . . .”).
91 See, e.g., People v. Killibrew, 416 Mich. 189, 205 (1982) (“[A] trial judge
shall not initiate or participate in discussions aimed at reaching a plea agreement.
He may not engage in the negotiation of the bargain itself.  The trial judge’s role in
the plea-bargaining procedure shall remain that of a detached and neutral judi-
cial official.”).
92 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498–99 (1966) (holding that a
waiver of Fifth Amendment constitutional rights must be made intelligently and
knowingly).
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waiving their jury trial rights.93  For prosecutors, the incentive
would be to win the case at trial, but for judges, incentives
might include control over the case’s outcome or the greater
efficiency of a bench trial.  Empirical evidence that this sort of
judicial pressure actually occurs in jurisdictions that require
court approval is difficult to find, however.
The most significant criticism of the prosecutorial veto,
however, is that it attempts to maintain a status quo that does
not actually exist.  Chief Justice Warren centered the Singer
opinion around the notion that where a defendant has an inter-
est to be served by the law, the government has an equal and
opposite interest.94  Unfortunately, that notion presumes that
the two parties begin the litigation on equal footing, a presump-
tion that is contrary to reality.  It is possible that granting a
defendant the unchecked and absolute capacity to waive the
jury trial right would actually work to weaken the defendant’s
position at trial.  However, there is no concern about the defen-
dant’s rights that, given the current state of the criminal justice
system, would be best resolved by adding to the prosecution’s
litany of institutional advantages.  The prosecutorial veto
serves the government’s interests even where those interests
are outweighed by the defendant’s, and in circumstances like a
plea bargaining meeting, the defendant needs additional pro-
tection from institutional unfairness more than the prosecu-
tion needs its interests satisfied.
The unfortunate consequence of the Court’s decision in
Singer was to reinforce systemic advantage in favor of the pros-
ecution.  With federal law on the matter settled, the balance of
the prosecutorial veto’s fate has fallen to state law, where, on
balance, it has again settled in favor of the prosecution.  Every
one of the fifty states has some relevant law on the matter,
which leaves little room for the law to change via the courts.95
If more states are going to eliminate the prosecutorial veto, it
will likely have to be through the legislature.
There are thirty states that still have a codified version of
the prosecutorial veto, and of the states without the
prosecutorial veto, only four have given a defendant the abso-
lute right to waive the jury trial right.96  It was encouraging that
the most recent state legislature to approach the issue, North
93 See JEFFREY B. WELTY & KOMAL K. PATEL, UNDERSTANDING NORTH CAROLINA’S
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ALLOWING NON-JURY FELONY TRIALS 7 (2014).
94 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
95 See infra APPENDIX.
96 See id.
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Carolina’s, declined to adopt the prosecutorial veto.  However,
given that there are no states remaining like North Carolina
that have no settled law on the subject, the likelihood for legis-
lative movement away from the prosecutorial veto at the state
level is low.97  The widespread adoption of the prosecutorial
veto is a disappointing development for those who view the
criminal justice system as inherently favoring the prosecution,
but it is not at all a development out of line with the modern
legal landscape for criminal defendants.  Of any group of par-
ticipants in the American criminal system, defendants are, af-
ter all, the most accustomed to losing.98
CONCLUSION
In 2002, Brian Banks was one of the most highly recruited
high school linebackers in the country when he was accused of
rape by a high school classmate.99  Banks pleaded no contest
to the charges and was sentenced to six years behind bars.100
He was released on probation after serving more than five years
in prison.  He spent five more years on “high custody parole”
while registered as a sex offender until his accuser recanted her
entire testimony, and Banks was exonerated.101  When asked
after his exoneration why he pleaded no contest, Banks said he
did so on advice from his attorney.102  He said he was told “that
[he] had no chance in trial because [he] was a big, black teen-
ager and the jury would be an all-white jury.”103
That the modern American criminal justice system is capa-
ble of imprisoning an innocent teenager for rape is not a de-
bated point, but that it happened illustrates the fundamental
barrier to justice that a defendant faces.  The defendant does
not enter the court room or the plea negotiation on equal foot-
ing with the prosecutor.  This is how, without ever going to trial
97 See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.
98 See generally DeCicco, supra note 6 (arguing there is an unfair system R
governing the defendant’s ability to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial).
99 See Gary Myers, Brian Banks Spent Five Years in Prison After Being Falsely
Accused of Rape, but Now He Finally Has a Career in NFL, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan.
25, 2015, 12:09 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/wrongfully-
imprisoned-banks-career-nfl-article-1.2090727 [https://perma.cc/E4BN-FRGK].
100 See Mike Tierney, At 28, Rookie Refuses to Focus on Time Lost, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/sports/football/at-28-
rookie-refuses-to-focus-on-time-lost.html [https://perma.cc/F6GJ-MTCX].
101 See Myers, supra note 99. R
102 See id. Banks said, after his exoneration, that before pleading no contest,
he turned down plea deals with the prosecution that would have put him in prison
first for twenty-five years, then for eighteen years, and then for nine years. See id.
103 Id.
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for a crime he did not commit, Brian Banks could still serve five
years of prison time.  He was at a disadvantage for a number of
reasons outside of his control, and there were very few defenses
between him and the government’s power to imprison him.
While discussing the pardoning power given to the presi-
dent in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution,104 Alexander
Hamilton wrote that “the benign prerogative of pardoning
should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.  The
criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary
severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of
unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too san-
guinary and cruel.”105  An absolute right to a jury trial waiver
would be a narrow one perhaps, but in a criminal justice sys-
tem so bereft of them, it would nonetheless be an exception in
favor of the unfortunate defendant, guilty or not.  With a sys-
tem as unbalanced as this one, it is not enough to continue to
pile procedures equally on both sides of the scales.  Only by
favoring the defense for as long as it takes to level it with the
prosecution can the criminal justice system self-correct.  For
some future defendant in a position similar to Brian Banks’s,
an absolute right to a jury trial waiver would be no small cor-
rection to the system.
104 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[H]e shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offences against the United States[ ].”).
105 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 482 (Modern Library 1937) (Alexander Hamilton).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN605.txt unknown Seq: 23 29-SEP-17 13:02
2017] THE HOUSE ALWAYS WINS 1739
APPENDIX
LIST OF STATE STATUTES, CASES, AND RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ON JURY TRIAL WAIVER
Alabama
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.1(b).
Alaska
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
Arizona
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.1(b).
Arkansas
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 31.1.
California
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
Colorado
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-101 (2016).
Connecticut
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-82(a) (2015).
Delaware
DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 23(a).
Florida
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.260.
Georgia
GA. CONST. art. I, stat. I, ¶ XI; see Pirkle v. State, 221 Ga.
App. 657 (1996).
Hawaii
HAW. R. PENAL P. 23(a).
Idaho
IDAHO CRIM. R. 23(a)–(b).
Illinois
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-6 (2016).
Indiana
IND. CODE § 35-37-1-2 (2016).
Iowa
IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.17(1).
Kansas
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3403(1) (2016).
Kentucky
KY. R. CRIM. P. 9.26(1).
Louisiana
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 780(B)–(C) (2016).
Maine
ME. R.U. CRIM. P. 23(a).
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MASS. R. CRIM. P. 19(a).
Michigan
MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.401.
Minnesota
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.01(2).
Mississippi
MISS. R. CRIM. P. 18.1(b).
Missouri
MO. R. CRIM. P. 27.01(b).
Montana
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-110(2) (2015).
Nebraska
State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451 (1968).
Nevada
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.011 (2015).
New Hampshire
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606:7 (2016).
New Jersey
N.J. CT. R. 1:8-1.
New Mexico
N.M. R. ANN. 5-605.
New York
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10 (McKinney 2017).
North Carolina
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.
North Dakota
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
Ohio
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 23(A).
Oklahoma
Crawford v. Boren, 536 P.2d 988 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
Oregon
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.001 (2015).
Pennsylvania
PA. R. CRIM. P. 620.
Rhode Island
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-3 (2016).
South Carolina
S.C. R. CRIM. P. 14(b).
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South Dakota
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-18-1 (2016).
Tennessee
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
Texas
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13(a) (West 2016).
Utah
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
Vermont
VT. CONST., ch. 1, art. 10.
Virginia
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-257 (2016).
Washington
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.060 (2016).
West Virginia
W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
Wisconsin
WIS. R. CRIM. P. 972.02(1).
Wyoming
WYO. R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
